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PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY-A MITIGATING FACTOR
One of the more perplexing and unsettled defenses in the field of
criminal law is that of insanity. The doctrine of partial or diminished
responsibility is one aspect of this defense,1 and the insistence with
which it has been urged upon the courts has increased in recent years.
2
The dominant proposition of the doctrine of partial responsibility is
this: the mental condition of the accused, though not amounting to
legal insanity,3 is relevant in determining whether he had the par-
ticular state of mind which common law or statutory definitions re-
quire as an essential element of the crime.4 The primary application of
the test has been in cases of first degree murder.5 Also, it has beel
applied in cases of felony murder so as to negative the mental state
required for the underlying felony.6 When applied to larceny the
doctrine would negative the animus furandi, the intent to steal.7
Similarly, this intent would be eliminated in robbery." In cases of
burglary the intent to commit a felony would be precluded.9 The
accused is not absolved of all criminal responsibility, for when the
required mental state has been negatived, he may be found guilty of an
offense of a lesser degree. For example, if the accused were charged
with first degree murder, the jury would be allowed to apply the test
'Insanity is a "generic term, comprehending all kinds and conditions of mental
unsoundness and derangement...." Ex parte McKenzie, 116 Tex. Crim. 144, 28
S.V.2d 133, 134 (Crim. App. 1930).
'See notes 11, 16, 24 infra.
31[1n law a man is insane when he is not capable of understanding (1) that
a design is unlawful, or that an act is morally wrong; or, (2) understanding this,
when he is unable to control his conduct in the light of such knowledge." Walters
v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Fed. 892, 894 (C.C.D. N.J. 188o).
'State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959).
5People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928); State v. Green, 78 Utah
58o, 6 P.2d 177 (1931); Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.V. 737 (1910).
People v. Rizzi, 297 N.Y. 874, 79 N.E.2d 274 (1948); People v. Levan, 295 N.Y.
26, 64 N.E.2d 341 (1945)-
"'Larceny is the wrongful taking and carrying away of the personal property
of another with the felonious intent to convert it to the taker's own use, and make it
his own property, without the consent of the owner." State v. Kavanaugh, 4 Penne.
131, 53 Atl. 335 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1902). "This specific, felonious intent to steal
is the gravamen of the offense...." Id. at 336.
'Robbery is generally defined as the taking of personal property of another from
his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation with intent
to -steal. Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 8oo, 133 S.E. 764, 767 (1926).
9"[B]urglary... is ... the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another
in the nighttime, with intent to commit a felony therein, whether the felony be
actually committed or not." Fidelity & Cas. Go. v. Wathen, 2o5 Ky. 511, 266 S.W. 4,
5 (1924)-
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to negative deliberation and premeditation. If the defendant were
found incapable of deliberation and premeditation, a verdict of
murder in the second degree might, nevertheless, be proper. A ma-
jority of the courts that have accepted the doctrine have been reluc-
tant to extend the reduction beyond murder in the second degree. 10
Two recent cases have reached opposite conclusions as to the ac-
ceptance of this doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Stewart v. United States" held, on third
appeal, that there was no error on the part of the District Court in
refusing to give an instruction which would allow the jury to con-
sider the diminished intellect of the defendant as a factor which
could reduce the degree of the offense. In this case the accused was
charged with first degree murder and robbery. At the trial, it was
revealed that prior to the offense Stewart had been engaged in a card
game at his home. During the evening he excused himself from the
game and proceeded to a nearby grocery where he made a few small
purchases. Upon being informed by the proprietor that it was closing
time, Stewart drew a gun and demanded the money in the cash
register. He shot the proprietor, killing him. instantly, scooped up
about $40o and fled. He returned to the card game and continued
playing until two o'clock the following morning. At the trial, a psychia-
trist who testified for the defendant stated that, in his opinion, Stewart
was suffering from a severe mental illness' 2 when he committed the
crime; that the results of intelligence tests placed him in the moron
category;l' and that he was not malingering during the tests. Expert
witnesses for the prosecution stated that the results of their investi-
gations revealed that the accused was mentally retarded but not
mentally defective.' 4 The case was reversed on appeal twice, 5 but
at the third trial the Court of Appeals rejected the partial responsi-
bility test and held Stewart guilty of first degree murder.
Conversely, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in State v. Padil
la,", found error in the failure of the court below to give an instruc-
'"See note 25 infra. But see State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177, 186 (1931).
"275 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 196o) .
'--'[Manic depressive psychosis." 275 F.2d at 620 (ig6o). See 2 Gray, Attorneys'
Textbook of Medicine r 1o3 (3 d ed. 1949).
"Perkins, Criminal Law 741 (1957). Under the Binet classification, a moron is a
person whose I.Q. falls in the range of 5o-59 (low grade) and 6o-69 (high grade).
"The term mentally retarded is distinguished from mentally defective in this
case in that it defines one with low intellect as opposed to one who has either a
congenital or post natal mental illness, i.e., neurosis or psychosis. 275 F.2d at 620.
;14 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954); 247 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959).
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tion which would allow the jury to consider the defendant's mental
condition as relating to his ability to premeditate. Padilla was charged
with first degree murder, having carnal knowledge of a child and kid-
napping. Prior to the crimes, Padilla drank beer for some twelve hours
and during that time smoked marijuana cigarettes. Afterwards, he
drove to the home of the child and abducted her. He raped the child
and stabbed her to death with a screwdriver. In holding the partial
responsibility rule applicable, the court noted the use of alcohol and
narcotics, but stated that the rule could be applied due to the de-
fendant's diminished intellect.
17
The District of Columbia Circuit has resisted the adoption of the
theory of partial responsibility since it was first proposed in Guiteau.'zs
Case's in 1882. This was the celebrated case of the assassin of Presi-
dent Garfield. Before the murder, Guiteau had concluded that "the
President's removal was a political necessity," because he had de-
stroyed the Republican Party by creating two divided factions; and
by this "removal" the party would be united and the government
would be saved from falling into the hands of ex-rebels and their
northern sympathizers. For this act Guiteau expected to receive the
accolade of the American people. Speaking of these strange motives
and expectations, the court said that a consideration of partial in-
sanity was too difficult for a jury and that the administration of justice
would be on surer ground by adhering to the "right and wrong" test'9
as the primary test of insanity. The court reaffirmed its position in
188520 saying that the law did not recognize degrees of insanity; there-
fore the principal test was that of the M'Naghten Case,2' i.e., the
"right and wrong" test. However, there was a shift in the court's view
in Durham v. United States.22 In that case the court adopted a rule
similar to the one in effect in New Hampshire since 1871 under which
an accused must be acquitted if his crime is a product of mental
disease or mental defect.2 3 Fourteen days after pronouncing the "prod-
'7347 P.2d at 315.
28Lo Fed. i6t (D.C. Cir. 1882).
"'his is the rule propounded as a result of the famous M'Naghten Case, io
Clark & Finnelly 2oo, 8 Eng. Rep. V 8, 721 (1843), which stated that one was insane
when he "was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
2*United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489, 54 Am. Rep. 293 (D.C. Cir. 1885).
2154 Am. Rep. at 294.
22214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See generally, Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1447 (1956);
Kalven, Insanity and the Criminal Law-a Critique of Durham v. United States,
22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1955); 53 Mich L. Rev. 963 (1955); 4o Va. L. Rev. 799 (1954)-
"State v. Jones, 50 N.H. a69 (1871).
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uct rule" in the Durham case, the Court again refused to accept the
doctrine of partial responsibility in the second appeal of the Stewart
case. The court said:
"[W~ge have concluded that reconsideration of [the rejection of
partial responsibility] 24 ... should wait until we can appraise
the results of the broadened test of criminal responsibility which
we recently announced in Durham. Only upon such an ap-
praisal will it be possible to determine whether need for the
rule remains." 25
In other words, the court intimated that it found merit in the par-
tial responsibility doctrine, but thought that the necessity for the
rule might have been eliminated by the adoption of the "product
rule." However, partial responsibility differs from the "product rule"
in that the former is not a total defense. It only reduces the degree
of the offense. Therefore, it is not entirely sound for the court to seek
to apply a test which would render the accused not criminally re-
sponsible in a situation where the chief aim is the reduction of the
degree of guilt. In Stewart the court finally rejected the doctrine, stat-
ing that the problem of applying the results of modern phychiatry
was "beyond the competence of the judiciary."26
Before Padilla, the courts in six states had accepted the doctrine
of partial responsibility.27 The language in the Padilla case points
out quite clearly the scope of the doctrine:
"[Partial responsibility] means the allowing of proof of mental
derangement short of insanity as evidence of lack of deliberate
or premeditated design. In other words, it contemplates full re-
sponsibility, not partial, but only for the crime actually com-
mitted."28
In applying the doctrine the court recognized that while the de-
fendant may not have been insane to an extent that would absolve
This court had rejected the doctrine of partial responsibility previously in
1945 in Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945). On appeal, the Supreme
Court stated that an explicit instruction on partial responsibility was unnecessary
because the instructions given had properly covered the questions of deliberation
and premeditation, irresistible impulse, malice and insanity. Justice Frankfurter,
in a vigorous dissent, attacked these instructions as "threadbare generalities"
and "empty abstractions .. mingled with talk about mental disease." Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463, 487 (1946).
M214 F.2d at 883.
n275 F.2d at 624.
"Hopkins v. State, i8o Ind. 293, 102 N.E. 851 (1913); People v. Moran, 249 N.Y.
179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928); Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555 (1846); State v. Green, 78
Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931); Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881); Obora
v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737 (190)
2'347 P.2d at 314.
i96i] 121
122 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
him from all punishment, yet he may have been incapable of the
premeditation and deliberation necessary to constitute first degree
murder. In a similar situation, he may have been incapable of form-
ing the requisite intent of the underlying felony in a felony murder.
29
The doctrine has been rejected in nine states30 and in the federal
courts.3 ' Generally, the states which have rejected the doctrine have
declared that the M'Naghten rule is the primary test of insanity.
3 2
When the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the "product rule,"
the M'Naghten test was apparently discarded. Nevertheless, recent
decisions by that Court indicate that the "product rule" merely sup-
plements the M'Naghten test.33
A result similar to that sought to be achieved by the rule of par-
tial responsibility is found elsewhere in the law.34 In the majority of
states, voluntary intoxication may be regarded as material in reduc-
ing the degree of a crime in that the intoxication renders the accused
incapable of forming the particular mental state required to establish
guilt.35 Some jurisdictions also recognize that the effects of drugs, 36
worry,37 disease,38 and lack of sleep3 9 will preclude the requisite mental
state and thereby reduce the degree of the offense. Under any of the
foregoing theories the result is the same-the reduction of the degree
of the crime due to the inability of the defendant to entertain the
requisite mental state, i.e., deliberation and premeditation or specific
"See note 6 supra.
=Hall v. State, 248 Ala. 33, 26 So. 2d 566 (1946); Daniels v. State, 186 Ark. 255,
53 S.W.2d 231 (1932); Everett v. State, 97 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1957); Reece v. State, 212
Ga. 626, 94 S.E.2d 723 (1956); Stewart v. State, 203 Miss. 295, 33 So. 2d 787 (1948);
State ex rel. Standefer v. England, 328 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); State v.
Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254 Pac. 858 (1927); State v. Byrd, 229 S.C. 593, 93 S.E.2d goo
(1956); Martinez v. State, 333 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
31275 F.2d at 623.
*2See cases cited at note 30 supra.
3'Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v.
Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1957).
"'The fact that the accused is a person of low intelligence or that by virtue of a
mental or neurological condition his ability to adhere to the right is diminished may
be a mitigating factor. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States ch. 24, 123 (1951).
322 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 68 (1940).
EState v. Close, 1o6 N.J.L. 321, 148 At. 764 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930); People v.
Sameniege, 118 Cal. App. 165, 4 P.2d 8og (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Johnson v. State, 32
Ala. App. 217, 24 So. 2d 228 (1946); State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958);
Milburn v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 188, 3 S.W.2d 204 (1928). See generally, 22 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 72 (1940).
. 31johnson v. State, 32 Ala. App. 217, 24 So. 2d 228, 230 (1945); State v. Close, io6
N.J.L. 321, 148 Ad. 764 (Ct. Err. & App. 193o); State v. Thompson, iio Utah 113,
170 P.2d 153, 158 (1946).
3Ibid.
Ibid.
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intent. It seems incongruous that some states accept the doctrine of
voluntary intoxication while rejecting that of partial responsibility. 40
The final application of the doctrine rests with the jury and is
useful only insofar as it enables them to arrive at a verdict which is
as appropriate as humanly possible. The proper application of this
test is difficult, but no more so than the application of a great many
principles to be found in the law.41 The goal of our system of juris-
prudence is equal justice, and the difficulty of arriving at this end
cannot be allowed to constitute a bar. The reluctance of a court to
adopt the doctrine may be seen in the practical argument that its
acceptance would allow mentally affected criminals to be released
and returned to society sooner than a criminal who is not similarly
affected. 42 However, once a court takes this position it has admitted
the verity of the doctrine. The solution lies not in rejecting the doc-
trine but in providing facilities for the rehabilitation of such persons.
Modern psychiatry recognizes that many varying degrees of mental
aberration exist.43 There is not, as the language of the courts in the
earlier cases would indicate, a distinct line between the sane and the
insane.44 Our society demands that the weight of criminal responsi-
bility placed on the mentally afflicted be lessened with the increase
in the degree of the affliction. The rule of partial responsibility is not
a panacea, yet it is a worthy supplement and must be urged on our
courts as another logical step in the orderly progress of criminal jus-
tice. JOSEPH M. SPIVEY, III
'See note 3o supra. Dyer v. State, 214 Ala. 679, 4 So. 2d 311, 314 (1941); Hankins
s. State. 2o6 Ark. 881, 178 S.W.2d i6 (1944); Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835,
845 ('891); Edwards v. State, 178 Miss. 696, 174 So. 57, 58 (1937); State v. Reagin,
64 Mont. 481, 210 Pac. 86, 88 (1922); State v. McCants, I Speer 384 (S.C. 1843). But
see State v. Shipman. 354 Mo. 265, 189 S.W.2d 273, 274 (1945); Dubois v. State,
164 Tex. Crim. App. 557, 301 SAW.2d 97, ioi (Crim. App. 1957).
"A jury faces the same problem in applying the test of partial responsibility as
it does in appling the "right and wrong" test, "irresistible impulse," and the "pro-
duct nile," that is, reaching a verdict on the basis of expert testimony.
In the law of damages: "Translating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best,
be only an arbitrary allowance, and not a process of measurement, and consequently
the judge can, in his instructions, give the jury no standard to go by; he can only
tell them to allow such amount as in their discretion they may consider reasonable."
McCormick, Damages 318 (1935).
In the law of torts: "It is difficult to escape the conviction that the refinements
which have been developed in instructing the jury (on the reasonable man test),
in the effort to avoid any personal standard, are artificial and unreal, and beyond
the comprehension of the average man in the box." Prosser, Torts 125 (2d ed. 1955).
'2Commonwealth v. Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410, 154 At. 483, 484-85 (1931).
'zS~mposium on Criminal Responsibility, 4 Kan. L. Rev. 349 (1956).
"Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Guiteau's Case, so Fed.
161 (D.C. Cir. 1882); United State v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489, 54 Am. Rep. 293 (D.C. Cir.
1885).
